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Since Chinas new Silk Road initiative, One Belt, One Road (OBOR, see 
boxed text), was irst announced in 2013, it has provoked a wide variety of 
reactions, partly because details of the new strategy were slow to emerge. 
While the stated goal of OBOR is to expand ties between Asia, Africa and 
Europe across a range of sectors, uncertainty about the precise aims and 
impact of the policy remain. This is true especially for the states on China’s 
periphery, who face a balancing act between enjoying the potential beneits 
of increased economic interaction with their larger neighbor and becoming 
too dependent.
Nowhere are these concerns more relevant than 
in Mongolia. The country plays a key role in 
OBOR plans and has had close ties to China, 
both recently and historically. While Mongolia 
aligned with the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War, its ties to China have strengthened since 
the early 1990s. As a result, Mongolia has be-
come more and more economically dependent 
on its southern neighbor. Much of this depend-
ence results from geography. Mongolia is a 
landlocked country with only two international 
borders, one that it shares with Russia in the 
north and the other with China in the south. 
These factors make Mongolia particularly vul-
nerable to shifts in Chinese domestic and for-
eign policy.
Today, more than three years after Xi Jinping 
irst announced the new Silk Road initiative, the 
contours of the policy are beginning to take 
shape and an initial assessment can be made of 
its ramiications for Mongolia.
OBOR and Mongolia
Mongolia is part of China’s OBOR strategy in a 
number of ways. Most fundamentally, the coun-
try forms part of the China-Mongolia-Russia 
Economic Corridor, one of six such corridors 
identiied in OBOR documents.
Blickwechsel | April 2017Seite 2
Since OBOR was announced, the intensiication 
of Sino-Mongolian relations has been relected 
in a series of high-proile meetings, beginning 
with a meeting of President Xi Jinping of China 
and Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, 
as well as Russian President Vladimir Putin, in 
2014, during the Dushanbe Summit of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In that 
same year, the bilateral relationship between 
Mongolia and China was elevated to a compre-
hensive strategic partnership. In November 
2015, Xi and Elbegdorj met again to discuss co-
ordinating OBOR with Mongolias own national 
development strategy, the Steppe Road, an indi-
cation of China’s eforts to promote the win-win 
nature of OBOR. Last year on June 23 and 24, 
2016, president of Mongolia Ts.Elbegdorj, Pres-
ident of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of 
China Xi Jinping sealed the agreement on in 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The trilateral economic 
corridor is a major cooperation initiative aligns 
China’s Silk Road Economic Belt initiative, Rus-
sia’s Trans-Eurasian Belt Development initia-
tive, and Mongolia’s Steppe Road Program.
Cooperation in other areas has also increased. 
The two countries have implemented a currency 
swap and preferential loans have been provided 
to Mongolia by the Chinese via the Silk Road 
Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB), the latter of which Mongolia is a 
founding member. Both institutions play key 
roles in funding OBOR projects. Following a 
transit agreement in 2015, border trade zones 
were created and Mongolia was given access to 
the port of Tianjin, a priority for the Mongolian 
government. In the same year, a controversial 
land-lease agreement was signed (see below). 
Infrastructure projects focusing on investments 
in road, rail, energy and border facilities have 
been announced and implemented, though con-
struction activity has concentrated on the Chi-
nese side of the border. Finally, China has made 
an efort to strengthen people-to-people ties by 
establishing Confucius Institutes, building a 
children’s hospital in Ulaanbaatar and promot-
ing student exchanges.
Tensions in the 
 Sino-Mongolian relationship
As Sino-Mongolian exchanges have intensiied, 
a number of concerns have been raised. Chief 
among these is Mongolia’s growing economic 
dependence on China. In 2015, for instance, 
Mining proj-
ects, as well as 
existing and 
planned 
infrastructure 
along the 
China-Mongo-
lia-Russia 
Economic 
Corridor.
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more than 80 % of Mongolian exports went to 
the PRC, up from just under 50 % in 2005. Of 
these, the vast majority were mineral resources. 
This makes Mongolia extremely vulnerable to 
economic luctuations in China. Similarly, China 
has become Mongolia’s largest source of for-
eign direct investment (FDI) in recent years, as 
well as an important lender. These changes have 
come about as economic growth and overall FDI 
in Mongolia have dropped sharply.
Other concerns have been political in nature. 
These came to the fore in November 2016, when 
the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia. China’s stern 
warnings to the Mongolian government prior to 
the visit went unheeded in what appeared to 
have been an example of a smaller state refus-
ing to buckle under Chinese pressure. In the 
aftermath of the visit, China raised tarifs on 
Mongolian goods, blocked a border crossing 
point and canceled intergovernmental negotia-
tions between the two states. In response, the 
Mongolian government expressed its regret 
over the incident and signaled that the Dalai 
Lama would not be allowed to enter the country 
again under the current administration. Rela-
tions between the two states were said to nor-
malize shortly thereafter.
In addition, there are reports of Mongolian fears 
that China will infringe on the nation’s sover-
eignty. These concerns were fueled by the 2015 
land-lease agreement mentioned above. Lo-
cated in Mongolia’s easternmost province, Dor-
nod Aimag, which borders both China and Rus-
sia, the 500,000 hectares of land covered by the 
agreement are to be used for agricultural pro-
duction and export.
Finally, there has been criticism that China is not 
taking responsibility for the environmental im-
pact of the investments of Chinese companies 
and lenders abroad. In Mongolia, the most prom-
inent example of this is the Egiin Gol hydro-
power project. The project would see a dam built 
on the Eg River in northern Mongolia and is part 
of a Mongolian plan to reduce the nation’s de-
pendence on Russian energy by developing hy-
dropower resources. The China Export-Import 
Bank, which predates OBOR but plays an active 
role in the initiative, agreed to provide the Mon-
golian government with a one billion USD loan 
to inance the project. The construction com-
pany China Gezhouba began work on access 
roads and bridges last winter. In 2016, however, 
China halted the project due to a disagreement 
with Russia over the impact of the dam on the 
ecology of Lake Baikal. Currently, Mongolia is 
seeking funding elsewhere. While the project 
clearly relects the interests of a variety of stake-
holders, it served to highlight the lack of envi-
ronmental standards for OBOR projects.
Gauging OBOR’s impact
While these developments are concerning, they 
are not caused only by OBOR. According to 
World Bank statistics, for example, China has 
been a key trading partner for Mongolia since 
the late 1990s, with a sharp uptick in the per-
centage of exports going to China noticeable 
from 2005, well before OBOR was implemented. 
In addition, reports of China dominating foreign 
investment in Mongolia are paralleled by a 
sharp decline in investment from other sources. 
Overall FDI in Mongolia plummeted from 4.5 bil-
lion USD in 2011 to less than 100 million USD 
in 2015, according to the World Bank. Tensions 
between the government and Rio Tinto, a Brit-
ish-Australian mining giant, go some way to-
wards accounting for this drop, as they have 
prevented a multi-billion-dollar expansion of the 
Oyu Tolgoi copper mine.
The rise and fall of the the Egiin Gol Hydro-
power Project is similarly complex. In fact, the 
feasibility study for the Eg River dam was car-
ried out not by the Chinese, but by the Asian 
Development Bank. That a project very much in 
line with Mongolian government priorities was 
stopped in response to Russian criticism is in-
dicative of the challenges many OBOR invest-
ments face during implementation. What 
emerges is less an image of China pushing 
through projects at all costs, but rather one in 
which various actors attempt to further their 
interests.
Politically, China is likely to leverage its inlu-
ence to draw red lines on certain issues in Mon-
golia, as it does elsewhere. Preventing visits of 
the Dalai Lama is the most common objective of 
these eforts. Fears of China infringing on Mon-
golian sovereignty, however, may be overblown. 
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China has signed land-lease agreements similar 
to the one mentioned above with other neigh-
boring states.
These examples highlight the complexity of 
gauging the impact of OBOR on Mongolia, 
though it is clear that China’s inluence in the 
country is growing and will continue to do so. 
The question is how the Sino-Mongolian rela-
tionship can be shaped to encourage positive 
outcomes for Mongolia.
Shaping future ties
The Mongolian government will continue to play 
a key role in navigating the country’s relation-
ship with China. Its ability to do so may be 
greater than it appears at irst glance. For one, 
China needs to consider local interests as it 
seeks to expand its inluence abroad, especially 
in democracies like Mongolia where public 
opinion is important. This was highlighted by the 
2016 Mongolian parliamentary election, which 
saw a drastic shift in power from the Democratic 
Party, which was made responsible for the coun-
try’s dire economic situation, to the Mongolian 
People’s Party, with the latter picking up 65 of 
the 76 seats in the national legislature. The ini-
tial impact of the election on Sino-Mongolian 
relations appears limited and the landslide vic-
tory had much to do with Mongolia’s new major-
itarian electoral system. Still, the result clearly 
demonstrated the ability of Mongolian voters to 
hold their government accountable.
The Mongolian government can also take an ac-
tive role in shaping the nature of Chinese invest-
ments. As China becomes a global leader in re-
newable energy, for instance, Mongolia may be 
able to secure Chinese help in developing more 
sustainable energy sources. This will require 
aligning its domestic policies accordingly. To 
counterbalance the overreliance of its mining 
sector on Chinese demand for natural resources, 
Mongolia can take steps to diversify its economy 
by promoting eco-tourism, higher-value agricul-
tural exports and other sectors. Finally, the gov-
ernment can block or renegotiate investments 
which are deemed to run counter to Mongolian 
interests, as it did the Oyu Tolgoi mine expan-
sion.
China also has an interest in ensuring that it 
makes good on its promise to make OBOR ben-
eicial to participating countries. The Chinese 
government and its citizens will have to take on 
The six OBOR 
economic 
corridors as 
outlined by the 
National 
Development 
and Reform 
Commission
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a shared responsibility for the projects realized 
by Chinese companies or with Chinese funding 
abroad.
Civil society
Beyond the government level, civil society can 
also play a role in monitoring Chinese invest-
ments. In Mongolia, an initial framework for 
doing so exists from years of contending with 
foreign mining companies. The NGO OT Watch, 
which monitors the development of the Oyu Tol-
goi mine, is one prominent Mongolian civil so-
ciety actor. On the Chinese side, signs are 
emerging that the much talked about phenome-
non of NGO internationalization is creating the 
space needed for Chinese NGOs like Beijing’s 
Global Environmental Institute to act as watch-
dogs of China’s investments abroad.
Finally, China’s growing inluence should not 
distract from the other actors who continue to 
inluence Mongolian afairs. In 2010, Mongolia 
sought to secure foreign investment to develop 
the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine. An initial bid by 
companies from a variety of countries, including 
China’s Shenhua Mining, was blocked by Japan 
and South Korea after their companies had been 
excluded. Ultimately, Mongolia inds itself in the 
position of needing to manage the inluence of 
various actors, among which China is the most 
powerful.
In conclusion, OBOR has led to an intensiica-
tion of Sino-Mongolian ties, which has been 
accompanied by growing economic, political 
and environmental concerns. At the same 
time, isolating the efect of OBOR on indi-
vidual  developments is not straightforward. 
Diferent actors both in government and civil 
society will be called upon to ensure that a 
balance is struck between enabling Mongolia 
to reap the potential beneits of closer ties to 
China while taking stakeholder concerns into 
account.
What is One Belt, One Road?
The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative con-
sists of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road. It has become the 
key pillar of current Chinese President Xi Jin-
ping’s foreign policy. First mentioned in 2013, 
concrete plans for OBOR were released by Chi-
na’s National Development and Reform Commis-
sion in March 2015.
 While OBOR is not China’s irst regional policy 
initiative (China launched the Shanghai Cooper-
ation Organization with Russia in the 1990s), it 
is the most ambitious. Broadly speaking, the 
policy is designed to connect Africa, Asia and 
Europe along six economic corridors, namely, 
the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, 
the New Eurasia Land Bridge, the China-Central 
Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, the China-In-
dochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, the Chi-
na-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangla-
desh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor. 
Following the 2015 Nepal Earthquake, China 
further proposed establishing a China-Nepal-In-
dia Economic Corridor. According to the Chinese 
government, cooperation among the countries 
along these corridors, of which there are around 
60, would be pursued in the areas of policy, in-
frastructure, trade, inance and people-to-people 
ties.
 The initiative seeks to build on existing bilat-
eral and multilateral relationships, as well as 
new and existing institutions. The Silk Road 
Fund and the Asian Infrastructure and Invest-
ment Bank (AIIB), with a starting capital of 
40 billion and 100 billion USD, respectively, both 
provide funding for OBOR projects. Existing 
banks, like the China Export Import Bank are 
also involved. China envisions these banks as 
contributing to what could one day be trillions of 
dollars of investments in OBOR countries. As of 
2016, close to 900 billion USD of projects had 
been announced, though many of these predate 
OBOR and were simply rebranded.
 For China, OBOR is a vehicle for achieving a 
number of goals, the most ambitious of which is 
reestablishing China as a global power, in line 
with Communist Party rhetoric on national re-
vival. On the ground, this will involve Chinese 
companies building ports, roads, railroads, 
power plants and dams both at home, where 
provinces vie to take advantage of increased 
trade with OBOR countries, and abroad.
 Rather than a single clearly deined policy, 
OBOR is an attempt to give new focus to China’s 
interaction with the outside world and to re-
shape international economic structures to more 
closely relect Chinese interests.
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